Recently, Wang et. al. proposed a public auditing protocol with efficient user's revocation for shared data in the cloud storage (InfoCom 2013(InfoCom , 2904(InfoCom -2912. By taking a careful look at the scheme, we noticed that their scheme has inherent limitations. In short, In short, the auditor cannot find the correct public key to verify those re-signatures which are converted from the original signatures. In this paper, we show a detailed weakness analysis on Wang et al.'s protocol, and propose a solution to remedy the weakness without sacrificing any desirable features of the mechanism.
Introduction
Recently, sharing data with each other in a group is very popular with the development of data storage and sharing services provided by the cloud. In this work model, an original group user creates shared data and hosts them on the cloud server. After that, every group user is able to access and modify shared data so that he can share the latest version with the rest of the group. To protect shared data's integrity, all of the data, including the data created by the original group user and the data modified by different group users, should be signed before they
International Symposium on Computers & Informatics (ISCI 2015) are stored on the cloud server. Thus different data blocks are signed by different users due to data modifications performed by different users. Since each data block is signed by a group user, a public verifier, such as a third party auditor (TPA), can check data integrity in the cloud without downloading the entire data, referred to as public auditing.
When a user is revoked from the group, he is no longer able to access and modify shared data, and the signatures generated by him are no longer valid to the group [1] . Therefore, although the content of shared data is not changed during user revocation, the blocks signed by the revoked user have to be re-signed by an existing user in the group, so that, after the revocation, the integrity of the entire data can still be verified with the public keys of existing users only.
Most of the previous works [2, 3, 4, 5] focus on auditing the integrity of personal data and preserve identity privacy from the TPA. None of them considers the efficiency of user revocation when auditing the correctness of shared data until recently, Wang et al. [6] presented a public auditing mechanism with efficient user revocation in an untrusted cloud by utilizing proxy re-signatures. More precisely, once a user is revoked, the cloud is able to re-sign the blocks, which were signed by the revoked user, with a re-signing key. Meanwhile, the cloud, which is not in the same trusted domain with each user, is only able to convert the signature of the revoked user into a signature of an existing user on the same block, but it cannot sign arbitrary blocks on behalf of either the revoked user or an existing user.
In this paper, we revisit Wang et al.'s [6] public auditing protocol and show that there is an inherent limitation on their protocol. In short, the auditor cannot find the correct public key to verify those re-signatures which are converted from the original signatures. we show a detailed weakness analysis on Wang et al.'s protocol, and propose a solution to remedy the weakness without sacrificing any desirable features of the mechanism. 
Review the Protocol
After the re-signing, the original user removes user u i 's id from UL and signs the new UL.
 ProofGen. To audit the integrity of shared data, the TPA generates an auditing message as follows:
1) Randomly picks a c-element subset L of set [1, n] to locate the c selected random blocks that will be checked in this auditing task;
2) Generates a random l q y Z ∈ , for l ∈ L and q is a much smaller prime than p;
3) Outputs an auditing message ( , )
l l L l y ∈ , and sends it to the cloud.
After receiving an auditing message, the cloud generates a proof of possession of shared data M. More concretely, 
On the Security of the Protocol
This is section, we will show the weaknesses of Wang et. al's protocol.
Recall that to support dynamic data during public auditing, Wang et al. Moreover, in Wang et. al.'s experiments (See Section VI.C), they assume the size of an element of Z q is |q| = 80 bits, the size of a block identifier is |id| = 80 bits, while we find this is problematic, since the size of |id| must be bigger than the size of r i and could not be equal where id i = {v i ||r i ||s i }. Thus, we suggest that the size of an element of Z q is |q|=64 bits, the size of a block identifier is |id|=96 bits, the size of v i is 24 bits, and the size of s i is 8 bits.
Fix on Wang et.al's Public Auditing Mechanism
In this section, we try to fix Wang et al's Public Auditing protocol. Since the size of the translation list and its signature is very small, the computation cost for computing the signature by the cloud and verifying the signature by the auditor is also very small. Moreover the communication cost introduced by this list is small, too.
Summary
In this paper, we analyzed a public auditing protocol with efficient user revocation for shared data in the cloud storage proposed in [6] , and demonstrated that the auditor cannot find the correct public key to verify those re-signatures which are converted from the original signatures. We also fixed the weakness so that the revoked users' signatures can be verified correctly by the auditor, without losing any features of the original protocol.
